Is anyone interested in meeting next Wednesday, the 16th? There is a lot going on at the church that night, but we could meet at someone's house. Rustin has said his place is open in the past, or my house. Just let me know.

I am using a book for some of Caleb's homeschooling called Handbook of Christian Apologetics by Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli. It is a supplement to his logic course. I just read a section that spoke to some things we've been talking about recently and I thought I'd share it with you. Here he they are talking about getting back to a more traditional, Aristotelian, view of logic.

Restoring the Older Notion of Reason
To make this restoration possible, another restoration is necessary: a restoration of the older, larger notion of reason itself. This means essentially two things:
1. seeing our subjective, psychological, human processes of reasoning as participation in and reflections of an objective rational order, a logos, a "Reason" with a capital R; and

2. seeing reason not as confined to reasoning, calculating--what scholastic logic calls "the third act of the mind"--but as including "the first act of the mind": apprehension, intellectual intuition, understanding, "seeing," insight, contemplation.

Using Aristotelian Logic
These two positions we take concerning the nature of reason lie behind our use of Aristotelian logic. This is a logic of (linguistic) terms, which express (mental) concepts, which represent (real) essences, or the natures of things. (The Greek word logos has all three of these meanings.) Many modern philosophers are suspicious and skeptical of the venerable and commonsense notion of things having real essences or natures and of our ability to know them. Aristotelian logic assumes the existence of essences and our ability to know them, for its basic units are terms, which express concepts, which express essences. But modern symbolic logic does not assume what philosophers call metaphysical realism (that essences are real), but implicitly assumes instead metaphysical nominalism (that essences are only nomina, names, human labels), since its basic units are not terms but propositions. Then it relates these propositions in argumentative structures just as a computer can do: if p, then q; p; therefore q.

The human mind is indeed a computer--we do compute, after all--but it is much more than that. We can also "see," or understand. Behind our use of Aristotelian logic is our hope that all our arguing will begin and end with seeing, with insight. Thus, we usually begin by defining terms and end by trying to bring the reader to the point of seeing objective reality as it is.