Saturday, March 27, 2010
More Pre-modernism
Thursday, February 11, 2010
Monday, February 8, 2010
More Pre-Modernism
Friday, February 5, 2010
The Ontological Argument
Tuesday, January 5, 2010
Cory,I enjoy reading your posts and their responses. I cannot enter into you conversations at the level you men are, but am challenged by how you all think. I may be making myself vulnerable to your knowledge and study with this, however Iconsider your use of 'postmodernism' as a generalization. I'm not defending postmodernism any more than I would condemn modernism. Both have characteristics of value as well as areas of concern.This document that I've attached describes the difference and the reason for the apparent shift. Agree or disagree, it is interesting. I'm just concerned of generalizing statements that 'write off' an entire thought process by only citing the areas that align with existentialism.The 'emergent' church, in the strictest sense, is loosing ground to the more favorable 'missional' church. Both 'emergent' and 'postmodernism' (both of which many say we've moved beyond) were corrective measures and a reaction to bring balance to strict modernism which they would say elevated knowledge without regard to the experience and outworking of that knowledge alongside it.Anyway. Like I said, it's the generalization that hit me of center more than anything else. Otherwise, great discussion and admire the knowledge and history your guys bring to it.Vito
Tuesday, December 15, 2009
Existentialism and Postmodernism
Saturday, December 5, 2009
Faith
Friday, December 4, 2009
This was excellent reading. I'm not sure I get it all, but I think
you nailed Kierkegaard and his "Christian Existentialism." I thought
your reality check in the first paragraph regarding economics was
good too.
I was reading the paper last night and came across the attached
article about atheists who are promiting the idea of "goodness
without god." The christmas phrase "be good for goodness sake" is
being used in creative ways to speak to atheists about celebrating
holidays without the need for god. I've attached the article, but you
might not be able to read it.
You say in one paragraph "But Hegel was just working out the ideas of
those before him, such as Kant. Human reason was elevated to the
highest good in the universe, and what was good could actually be
determined by human reason." My question to you, regardint this
comment and the article in the paper is, "can a person really know
what's good and what's bad without God?" Also, if he were to truly
know it, can anyone really be "good" without the concept of God?
What are your thoughts on that?
Chuck
Tuesday, December 1, 2009
What was Kierkegaard thinking?
One thing about heresies is that they have a hint of truth in them. Marx thought that everything in life is determined by economic factors. He was wrong. That ignores that fact that God has a purpose in history, and he's the one in control. Economic factors might not be as important to Him, or might be irrelevant to His purposes. God is usually more concerned with what kind of stewards we are with what He has provided for us, how we develop our minds, how that affects our actions, and our love for others, and our place in eternity, etc. But that doesn't change the fact that some things in life are determined by economic factors. Ask any parent getting ready to send their kids to college, missionaries trying to raise support, a Christian charity, or anyone who is out of a job. Economics matter. But economic factores are not the only factors.
So, where's the hint of truth in Kierkegaard? Remember back when I proposed we follow Alasdair MacIntyre and broke history up into three time periods? There's the Judeo-Christian period, followed by the modern and postmodern. Kierkegaard agreed with me that the modern world had gone wrong. The Enlightenment had created an atmosphere that elevated human reason so high that they thought they could do anything, and they were in control of their own destiny. Newton's laws had come to be interpreted to mean the universe could survive on it's own, and as LaPlace famously stated, "I have no need of that [God] hypothesis." The result on the church was a dead, lifeless, mechanical church, as we have discussed.
One of the philosophers responsible for the decay of the church was Hegel, and Kierkegaard probably reacted against him more than anything else. But Hegel was just working out the ideas of those before him, such as Kant. Human reason was elevated to the highest good in the universe, and what was good could actually be determined by human reason. Kierkegaard saw the results of that in the church, and he reacted. He didn't want the mechanical, meaningless church. He wanted passionate and authentic people in the church, people who really lived out what they said they believed.
He was right in his recognition of a problem, and partially right in his diagnosis, but totally wrong in his solution. Where his diagnosis started to go wrong was in not reaassesing the role of human reason. He found that human reason couldn't take you to a vibrant, passionate faith. So he proposed a leap of faith, to get him beyond reason.
That's the problem. Human reason by itself is not enough, that is true. But the Christian response through the centuries had always involved an interplay between reason of faith, not the abandonment of reason to leap into the absurd. Aquinas had started to separate faith and reason many centuries before, to be sure, but the distinction wasn't so stark until the Enlightenment. The Christian response prior to the Enlightenment had been captured in the phrase, "Faith seeking understanding," or "I believe in order to understand." They realized human reason wasn't enough. But faith informed reason and reason informed faith. At some point there may have to be a leap, but as Pascal said, it's a leap in the light, not a leap in the dark.
In Surprised by Joy CS Lewis talked about a fellow student, an atheist, who announced to his friends that after looking into it, it appeared to him that the Christian story of God becoming a man really happened. With his reason he had found the truth, but he never combined that with faith. That student went mad. If I remember the story correctly he died (suicide?) soon after discovering the truth, but never became a Christian. Contrast that with Lewis. He had similar experiences in what he discovered about the historical truth, but this eventually informed his faith. His faith then led him to a better understanding of what his reason was telling him. It wasn't just a one way street, or a one way leap. What resulted was a set of coherent thoughts. In contrast, existentialism leads you to statments like Barth's, "It isn't true as a matter of history, but it is true as a matter of doctrine." In reality that is very incoherent.
The incoherence isn't necessary. It is possible to humble human reason without having to free yourself from it altogether. In fact, you can't. It is after all part of how God made us, "In His image." It also allows us to maintain some mystery in our faith, but helps us locate those mysteries more appropriately. God's ways are inscrutable (Isaiah). His ways are higher than our ways (Psalms). It only makes sense that God's ways are not going to be easy for us to grasp, and at times impossible to fully grasp. But usually we can at least say we know that something (like the resurrection) is true, even if we can't explain exactly how it happened.
The bottom line is that the existential turn is not necessary. You don't have to follow Kierkegaard to have passion or authenticity. But more importantly, he didn't provide a foundation for a strong faith.
Remember the meaning of logos. It is more than just "word". "In the beginning was the Reason, and the Reason was with God, and the Reason was God."
Finally, many Christians have recognized as their walk with God matures that faith isn't something they do. It is something that happens to them. Whatever you think about predestination, you have to admit that left on your own you never would have come to faith. C.S. Lewis' account of his conversion demonstrates this. Over a period of time he had encounters with something outside of himself that penetrated his heart. He recalls sitting on a bus and having the feeling that something, or someone, was stripping away the facades of his personage, layer by layer, and getting down to his heart. This was before he was a Christian. Later, he and his brother took a trip to the zoo. Lewis was riding in the sidecar of his brother's motorcycle. He says he doesn't remember making a conscious decision to trust the Lord, he just knows that on the way to the zoo he was not a Christian, but on the way back he was. His life had been given over to Christ, and he was committed to the truth. He says this was the freest thing he had ever done, and yet he could do no other. He elsewhere says that the idea of truth 'seekers' is really false. As sinners, seeking for God is like the mouse seeking the cat. Without God stirring the heart no one will seek.
What we see in Lewis' life is contrary to what Kierkegaard told us. Lewis didn't make a 'leap of faith' in which he abandoned the rational and embraced the absurd. There was an interplay between what was happening in his mind, intellectually, and his faith. And what happened to Lewis was, in a significant way, done to him. The existential catch-phrase, "reality viewed from the perspective of the actor," does not come close to explaining how we live our lives in reality. True faith is not a matter of us conjuring up our own feelings, and establishing meaning and purpose for ourselves. We have to come to rely on God. We don't do the work ourselves.
The connections between existentialism and postmodernism become clear at this point. One of the marks of postmodernism is a distrust of metanarratives. Postmoderns love narratives. Everyone has their own story. Everyone has their own adventure. But they disbelieve in any over-arching story that controls all of reality. They have no use for the meaning and purpose God designed into the universe, or for God's story of creation-fall-redemption. If everything is always about 'the actor', they'll never be able to submit to God.
Beyond Kierkegaard II
Sunday, November 29, 2009
Beyond Kierkegaard
Thursday, November 26, 2009
"You've got it wrong, Kierkegaard didn't mean the leap of faith as you described it. It's not that faith is to believe things that are not true. Kierkegard does NOT say you should have faith that 1+1=3.
A leap of faith is a sign of authenticity; in other words, our actions are an honest manifestation of our beliefs, rational thinking, personality, etc. Faith is the highest passion, passion to believe in ourselves, not in irrational things.
We've got to kill the mis-interpretation of Kierkegaard once and for all."
November 16, 2009 6:13 PM
The comment was left anonymously, but I welcome it. The more discussion the better. There is something in this comment that I definitely agree with. Our actions are manifestations of our beliefs, etc. In fact, that fits precisely with what I think is a good definition of faith: the ability to behave according to what we say we believe. Or, to believe something at a level that we can act on it.
But that is also why I disagree with Kierkegaard. In Fear and Trembling he is quite emphatic, many times over, that faith is a belief in the absurd. Abraham is, of course, his object of study there. He assiduously proclaims that what Abraham did, and the faith he had, was absurd. He might as well have said Abraham believed that 1 + 1 = 3. But he disregards what else we know about Abraham. Paul said in Romans 4:20 - 21 (ESV), "No distrust made him waver concerning the promise of God, but he grew strong in his faith as he gave glory to God, fully convinced that God was able to do what he had promised." Abraham had come a long way in his relationship with God. He followed God's direction to Canaan, had personally received the covenants (Gen 12, 15, 17). He entertained and challenged angels and the Lord Himself (Sodom and Gomorrah). Yet we see him fail on occasion. He disowned his wife twice out of fear, once in Egypt and once with Abimelech king of Gerar (he was a slow learner at times). Hagar bore Ishmael because of Abrahams lack of faith. But by the time God called him to sacrifice Isaac Abraham had learned a lot. The knowledge that God would keep his promises and could bring Isaac back from the dead was no longer an absurd idea. It may seem absurd to you and me, and Kierkegaard, but we haven't had the same relationship with God that Abraham did.
That's my main point. What Abraham did wasn't absurd from the perspective of someone who could see things more and more from God's perspective, and less and less from our everyday experience. It is more accurate to say that it was more absurd for Abraham to follow God's first direction and leave the land of his fathers than it was to follow God's direction in regard to Isaac, from Abraham's perspective at that point in his life.
This can be demonstrated also in the life of Karl Barth, who is a descendant of Kierkegaard's in terms of his ideas. Friends of mine have commented that they think Barth was the greatest Protestant theologian in the 20th century. I have to disagree. There is of course much to admire in Barth, and I'm not claiming to be an expert on him. But he made the comment, both in regard to The Fall and the Incarnation/Resurrection, that it is not true as a matter of history, but it is true as a matter of faith/doctrine. Now, that is as clear as you can get. Actually believing in an historical resurrection is as absurd as 1 + 1 = 3, to Barth. But he's going to believe anyway. Not that it really happened, but in his faith.
In my view it is important to believe that the resurrection happened as a matter of fact. See 1 Cor 15. But that's not the point here. The point is that to Kierkegaard, to make that 'leap of faith' is indeed to believe in something absurd. That is not what our faith is supposed to be.
It seems that Kierkegaard wasn't the first to talk about a 'leap of faith'. Pascal, at least, had used the phrase before him. But Pascal was clear that it is a 'leap in the light, not a leap in the dark.' In that sense I have no problem with leaps. But I've seen nothing that changes my view that Kierkegaard saw the leap of faith as an irrational belief in the absurd.
Finally, the commentator said that faith is the passion to believe in ourselves. Kierkegaard very well may have thought that. It is a very existentialist thing to say. But that is my problem with existentialism. Faith isn't a belief that we just conjure up, and it isn't a belief in ourselves. Properly understood, in my view, it is the object of our faith that is important, and our ability to behave according to what we say we believe.
Monday, November 16, 2009
Kierkegaard
Wednesday, October 14, 2009
Dostoevsky and Existentialism
Thursday, October 8, 2009
Existentialism
Tuesday, September 29, 2009
Existentialism
Tuesday, September 8, 2009
I am using a book for some of Caleb's homeschooling called Handbook of Christian Apologetics by Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli. It is a supplement to his logic course. I just read a section that spoke to some things we've been talking about recently and I thought I'd share it with you. Here he they are talking about getting back to a more traditional, Aristotelian, view of logic.
Restoring the Older Notion of Reason
To make this restoration possible, another restoration is necessary: a restoration of the older, larger notion of reason itself. This means essentially two things:
1. seeing our subjective, psychological, human processes of reasoning as participation in and reflections of an objective rational order, a logos, a "Reason" with a capital R; and
2. seeing reason not as confined to reasoning, calculating--what scholastic logic calls "the third act of the mind"--but as including "the first act of the mind": apprehension, intellectual intuition, understanding, "seeing," insight, contemplation.
Using Aristotelian Logic
These two positions we take concerning the nature of reason lie behind our use of Aristotelian logic. This is a logic of (linguistic) terms, which express (mental) concepts, which represent (real) essences, or the natures of things. (The Greek word logos has all three of these meanings.) Many modern philosophers are suspicious and skeptical of the venerable and commonsense notion of things having real essences or natures and of our ability to know them. Aristotelian logic assumes the existence of essences and our ability to know them, for its basic units are terms, which express concepts, which express essences. But modern symbolic logic does not assume what philosophers call metaphysical realism (that essences are real), but implicitly assumes instead metaphysical nominalism (that essences are only nomina, names, human labels), since its basic units are not terms but propositions. Then it relates these propositions in argumentative structures just as a computer can do: if p, then q; p; therefore q.
The human mind is indeed a computer--we do compute, after all--but it is much more than that. We can also "see," or understand. Behind our use of Aristotelian logic is our hope that all our arguing will begin and end with seeing, with insight. Thus, we usually begin by defining terms and end by trying to bring the reader to the point of seeing objective reality as it is.